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This presentation

- Is about:

Interactions between middleboxes and untrusted, end-host applications

- Is not about: (but is complementary to)

Middlebox control by trusted application-layer gateways

Man-in-the-street Definitions of a Middlebox

“A pragmatic device that transparently fixes packet flows between flawed endpoints.”

— Engineer running a network

“A flawed device that breaks transparency by impeding the flow of packets between endpoints.”

— End-to-end/transparency purist
— Frustrated user

Examples: Firewall, NAT, TCP PEP, etc...

Flawed? A question of agility:

Incapable of adequately supporting a necessary protocol or policy.

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Adequate = securely, fairly, ...

Protocol = IPv6, IPsec, window scaling, global addresses, session bundles, ...

Incapable = Not under your administrative domain of control

- Site's networking group can't manage all of site's desktops
- Desktop users can't control the network provider's firewall

End-to-end Nirvana

- Every end host is well-managed and supports everything necessary to work across every kind of network (IPv4, IPv6, Long Fat Networks, wireless, adversarial).
- Deployment cost: Deploy each new feature to each host

Reality

- Update end hosts once every few years
- All other changes made with middleboxes

Current Trend

- Network peers provide services that enable end nodes to work across every kind of network
 - e.g. SOCKS, RSIP, IPsec tunneling, HTTP Proxies
 - Clients are aware of middlebox and request functionality
- Deployment cost: Deploy each framework protocol to each host and then update/manage small number of servers.
 - Server deals with changing policies and protocols
 - Clients are less well managed and trusted
 - Clients submit themselves to the whims of servers

Observations

Application only sees end-to-end byte stream or message payloads.

Expectation is that packets are end-to-end, but frequently not so.

Middleboxes perform transport splicing/spoofing.

Why not have add a thin abstraction layer between the application and the transport protocols to provide end-to-end stream of messages over a series of transport connections?

Future? A Session Setup Protocol

Deploy a *single* framework protocol to each host and then update/manage small number of servers.

- Provide end-to-end byte stream or datagram payloads
- Relay data across a series of transport layer connections
- Middleboxes operate only at transport endpoints; no mucking with something that is supposed to be e2e.
- Applications agree (or not) to the requirements (policy) of the middlebox
- Is a single, flexible framework protocol feasible?


Good question. Let's try.

Encouraging thoughts:

- SOCKS is used for many applications.
- Who'd have thought that HTTP would be used for everything? (RPC, e-mail, etc.)

Requirements

- Middlebox discovery
- Mutual authentication (n -way)
- Encryption (e2e or between hops)
- Abstract view of e2e network connection without assuming e2e packets
 - Build (a series of) transport connections between middleboxes
- Compatibility with current protocols and middleboxes
 - Some new protocols (telephony, etc.) have more freedom
- Dynamic reconfiguration (mobility, topology changes)
 - New middlebox in path triggers renegotiation
 - One or more transport hops may change (TCP Connection Migration)
- Minimize need for Application Layer Gateways



Design Decisions

How much of the needed functionality is already present in protocols like SOCKS and SIP?

- New IP option for discovery.

- Use SOCKS as base for setting-up each transport conn?

How much of this is just engineering and how much is still experimental?

- We have experience with several point-solutions.

- Now we just need to generalize.

Should this protocol be distinct from a protocol that allows ALG control?

Questions?
Comments?
Rants?

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